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I
The institutional investor-comprised largely of insurance companies and banks
-is one of the most important classes of securities purchasers. Many of these or-
ganizations throughout the country were asked the general summarizing question:
"Do you see any marked difference between conditions now as compared with
pre-Securities Exchange Commission times in their effect upon your own investment
policies and programs?" The answer was an almost unanimous "Nol"
Such a broad categorical statement, however, needs- some qualification. The
question and answer could easily dismiss the subject as to the net effect upon insti-
tutional investment policies, but some attention must be given to both the favorable
and unfavorable features whose sum total appears to be not far from zero.
It has been the writer's experience-and likewise that of most of those in a similar
capacity with whom this problem has been discussed-that little has been accom-
plished to alter in any noticeable degree the investment status of institutions as a
whole. Rather, paths smoothed out in the approach to the investment problem have
been offset by the rocky roads left open in the changed course that must now be
pursued.
Greater Information Available
Foremost among the benefits of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, is the accessibility of more information with
respect to companies whose securities are presently outstanding or about to be issued.
There can be no doubt of the great advantages gained. Here the accomplishment
has been specific, helping all classes of investors. Whether complete advantage is
taken of this opportunity by the smaller institutions is beside the point. At least it
is there for their use.
To institutions whose investment analysis is more painstaking, the information
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now given on new issues in regard to affiliations, contracts, litigation, investment
accounts, contingent liabilities, stock ownership, etc., is of tremendous importance.
Moreover, the knowledge that there is slight possibility of misrepresentation or
omission of material facts is not only a comfort but a distinct aid in the elimination
of much research work.
This dissemination of more detailed information is a progressive step in setting
up improved standards of investment practice. The provisions of the Acts calling
for this have developed and should continue to develop a greater spirit of co-operation
in disclosing necessary data, not because of the requirements of the law alone, but
as a tradition and a custom. It is already spreading into channels affecting securities
of companies which have not raised any capital since the inauguration of the new
federal securities legislation. Witness the gradual broadening and delineation of
facts in interim and annual reports. Witness the increased endeavors on the part
of the New York Stock Exchange to obtain in listing statements such information
as was formerly considered sacred.
To the larger institutions the effect of the new form of publicity of data has been
somewhat overrated. The invested assets of these institutions comprise well over
two-thirds of the total of all such institutional invested assets. Their security buyers
are trained and sophisticated; they usually have experienced assistance in performing
necessary investigational work; they know what they want and what to look for
and where to go to get it. Even with the information made available under the
new legislation, there is still much research work to be done on matters not disclosed
in a registration statement of a new issue or of an issue listed on a national exchange.
With all the information now provided, the responsibility for getting the answers
to problems not covered in the form of publicity presently required cannot be
avoided. This may again be considered as beside the point, but it indicates that
the value of this aspect of the legislation is entirely relative.
Evils Eliminated
Of importance are the restraints now imposed upon corporations and investment
bankers foisting new issues upon institutions and individual investors with a paucity
of information. The gullibility of a certain section of the smaller institutional in-
vestors can probably never be appeased, but the chances are slight of their being
imposed upon to the extent they formerly were. The only.practical offset to this is
the fact that with the extreme care now necessary for sellers, and with distributing
profits cut, the smaller institutions receive much less attention. In a great many
cases they are eliminated entirely with no chance whatsoever to purchase new issues.
On the other hand, the Securities Act tends to lessen the danger of smaller institu-
tions becoming overloaded with securities of a non-institutional character through
high pressure salesmanship.
While still a matter of opinion, it is unlikely that a gigantic fraud such as Inter-
national Match could again be perpetrated upon investors. No apologies are needed
for the institutions who purchased Mr. Kreuger's securities, but under the new Act
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they will probably not be caught again. Further, irregularities exposed in recent
years in Simmons Co., Gillette and other companies would undoubtedly have been
prevented in their inception. By hindsight, the advantages would have been obvious.
Of no little importance, also, is the fact that the information now available under
the Securities Act tends to reduce the spread between offering price to the public and
the price received by the issuer. A price spread of 3/2 points is a rarity today,
whereas prior to the Act this spread was more often near the minimum range.1
It may be said that the combination of high-grade refunding financing and low
money rates with the plethora of funds seeking investment would have brought this
result in any event, but it appears that the new legislation is the real motivating
factor. The benefits to both issuer and buyer are apparent.
Protective Measure Improved
Two of the finest pieces of work done by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion to date, and of particular advantage to institutions, are (i) that of attempting
to define trustees' functions more clearly, and (2) steps taken to eliminate the
protective committee racketeer.2
In regard to the former, institutions have deplored the looseness of indenture
provisions regarding trustees' powers and the mockery of remedies offered. In
numerous cases they have refused to buy certain issues for that very reason. Any
tightening of these provisions as a result of the Commission's activity-and the work
done so far should have some helpful effect even if it is carried no further-is a
definite gain.
The protective committee racket has been a thorn in the side of institutions. In
most major instances, institutional representatives are and have been the leaders in
serving the interests of security-holders when difficulties arise. The minority com-
mittees, frequently formed in the past with some ulterior motive, should now be
largely eliminated.
The Securities Act Not Responsible for Lack of New Capital Financing
The Securities Act often has been accused of being an obstacle to new capital
financing and of having eliminated a large source of investment for institutional
funds. There is an almost complete unanimity of opinion among institutions that
this criticism is unjustified and that other economic factors are in reality the cause.
Without attempting any elaborate proof of the soundness of this position, two facts
alone will provide ample evidence.
'For a table presenting spreads on issues before and after the Act, see Gourrich, supra, p. 69.
2 The Commission is conducting a broad investigation of the "Work, Activities, Personnel and Func-
tions of Protective and Reorganization Committees," the results of which have been published in part.
Specific recommendations are made to Congress for legislation which will strengthen weaknesses that
exist. Although no definite action has been taken as yet, the publicity accorded these studies and resulting
recommendations for legislation has had an immediate effect in transforming trustees' inertia into action
and in curbing protective committee excesses. With regard to the latter, the necessity for registration
with the Securities and Exchange Commission upon issuance of reorganization securities is also a -check
on improper practices.
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First, railroads are exempt from registration under the Act. The absence of new
capital financing by the rails cannot, therefore, be laid at its door. Second, financing
for refunding purposes has been prolific in all types of industries. With all the
attendant disadvantages of cost, etc., corporations have not refrained from under-
going the painful process of meeting registration requirements under the Act, where
real savings or other adyantages accrue. After all, those registration requirements
for refunding purposes are precisely the same as they would be for new capital
purposes--ergo, if new capital were needed, it would be obtained! From this view-
point, institutions appear to have suffered no harm as a result of the Securities Act.
"Beating the Gun"
Of all the controversial questions that arouse a storm of discussion -with regard
to new 'security issues, "beating the gun" has received more attention than it de-
serves. So little harm could result from a liberal interpretation of this section of the
1933 Act and so little could be gained from its strictest enforcement that the entire
matter is considerably over-emphasized. It becomes a nice question as to which side
is the real winner in either event. As usual, attempts to regulate and control human
behavior cause great ruptures in the body politic and great infractions of the rules.
In this case, the expected result is seen-the condition is now as bad as or worse than
it was before the Act was passed.
In the trade, "beating the gun" means making commitments for sale or purchase
of new issues before the effective date of a registration statement. Despite all at-
tempts to stop'this practice, it has persisted, with institutions being largely in the sup-
posedly "favored" class of buyers. No one will deny that" institutions as a class
make up the backbone of the new issues market. Without them, capital could be
raised only with great difficulty and at a much higher cost. Their role in our finan-
cial system of accumulating funds to provide capital is integral-they represent the
public in the form of depositors, policy-holders, et al. Why, then, can there be any
complaint about their receiving favored treatment, if such it be?
But the subject strikes deeper than this somewhat specious reasoning. While
most institutional buyers are attempting to obey the law (they are as culpable as
the seller if they make a definite purchase commitment before the effective date),
those who are meticulous are injuring themselves the mQst. To follow the law to
the letter means to work blindly. If, for example, after proper study, an institution
decides to. invest $i,ooo,ooo in a forthcoming issue, it may eventually be able to
obtain only $Io,ooo to $25,ooo at the offering price under present conditions. This
is hardly intelligent investing. It could formerly plan exactly and purchase its
requirements directly from the underwriting syndicate or banking group members.
Now it must scramble with every individual one-bond buyer and perhaps purchase
from as many as 2oo different dealers scattered throughout the country, nonetheless
not getting all it desires. The waste and added costs are self-evident.3 The stimula-
3 institutions frequently complain of the number of prospectuses received describing a single new issue.
Some of the larger institutional investors receive as many as 250 prospectuses, with an actual need for
but two or three. While not required under the law, most underwriting firms request acknowledgments
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tion to "free riders" has been enormous under present market conditions, and will
eventually hurt the establishment of free markets under less favorable money and
market circumstances.
This is not the procedure followed by large sellers and buyers of commodities
or manufactured articles. Why should there be any difference with respect to securi-
ties? It is difficult to see where harr4 can be done by making initial offerings to
large buyers. Certainly it is less expensive to the underwriters and therefore less
costly to issuer and buyer. In these days of excessive cash funds, the larger institu-
tions suffer because of their inability to put this cash to work-partly for the reason
already given.
To attempt to draw a line of demarcation and define when submission of data
on a new issue is or is not an offering is nothing but legal acrobatics-it would be
classed by a practical man as pure nonsense. No one is fooled-buyer and seller
both know what each is after, and a commitment can be made by a mere meeting
of minds without a mention of the fact. Institutions are heartily sick of these silly
subterfuges and thin disguises. They don't want "beating the gun" stoppedl
Enforcement of this section of the 1933 Act is as useless as King Canute's efforts
to stem the tide. It should be altered and modified to allow free and open discussion
of new issues with potential buyers without this sophistic bush-beating and the
creation of stealthy law violators. In all fairness it should be said that the Securities
and Exchange Commission is not unaware of the situation the law has created and
is cognizant of the difficulties in interpreting it. This has been shown in certain of
its releases and in the mild charges brought against a group of underwriters on this
score in June 1936. It is to be hoped that, in the absence of any change in the law,
the Commission will continue to devote its attention to other more important
matters. Private Placements
Because of excessive costs, or for other internal reasons, many corporations have
avoided registration under the Act and have sold their securities privately. The
larger institutions, in general, have been the principal purchasers of such issues.
This trend has shown a tendency to increase since the establishment of the Securities
Act. According to the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, a total of over $212,-
ooo,ooo was privately placed in the first seven months of 1936, or more than 70 of
all corporate financing during that period.4 Occasionally, an issue may be registered
subsequent to its having been privately sold. This took place before the enactment
of the 1933 Act, both in complete private placements and in the sense that a large
part of major new issues may have been sold to institutions before being offered to
the public-usually the latter. As contrasted with the situation existing before the
Act, the present procedure now holds some definite disadvantages.
of prospectuses for their own protection under Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. It is not feasible
for institutions to cooperate in this regard.
' For tables presenting data on private placements since the adoption of the Act, see Gourrich, Invest-
ment Banking Methods Prior to and Since the Securities Act of z933, Table V, supra, p. 64, and Gold.
schmidt, Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, Table , sura, p. 21.
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In the old days, it was often the case that underwriters discussed features of a
proposed offering with institutional buyers. This was helpful to them and also to
the institutions since they frequently were responsible for tightening various inden-
ture provisions and for improving the terms in some instances. Their judgment
was valuable to the banker and lessened his burden of attempting to serve the in-
terests of the issuer and the public--extremely opposing viewpoints. The efforts of
institutions to strengthen the investment status of a new issue for their own purposes
were safeguards to the public who likewise purchased the new securities. These
institutions now are able to dictate terms on private placings with them, but, since
there can be no subsequent partial sale to the public, the public loses those benefits.
Means should be found to restore this form of protection to smaller institutions and
non-institutional investors.
The growth of private placings excludes the smaller institutions and individuals
and eliminates a source of employment of their funds. This is true both in original
offering and in the lack of a subsequent open market in which to buy. Most private
placings, whether later registered or not, are closely held and unlikely to be redis-
tributed.'
This matter ties in closely with the law aimed at "beating the gun." There now
can be no pre-public offering to institutions-a new issue must be placed privately
as a whole or offered to institutions and the public simultaneously. The Securities
and Exchange Commission can do nothing about this without an amendment to
the Act, the need for which is readily apparent. A return in this respect to condi-
tions ante-dating the Securities Act, with open dealings permissible after filing date
rather than effective date, would be salutary.
Thin Markets
Although governmental control of markets is accomplished under the Securities
Exchange Act rather than under the 1933 Act, legislative regulation of markets is
mentioned here because of its importance to institutions. Many institutions invest
in common and preferred stocks, essentially on a long term growth basis and as a
precautionary measure against changes in dollar purchasing power. Despite protesta-
tions to the contrary and whatever other advantages may accrue, it is the consensus
of opinion among trained security buyers that regulations on specialists, floor traders
and professional non-member traders, psychological limitations on short sellers and
legitimate speculators, high margin requirements and rulings pertaining thereto,
publication of purchases and sales of officers, directors and large owners, etc., have
a restrictive effect upon markets outweighing the benefits gained. The result is
exaggerated price movements in both directions, particularly on the decline. Unfor-
tunately (in a sense), this opinion has not been tested as yet. Beyond temporary
and sporadic periods of liquidation, the trend of all security markets has been con-
sistently upward since the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act.6
While having no present application, there exists the possibility that a growth in private placements
might reduce the liquidity of institutional portfolios.
"This fact must temper all criticisms of the z933 and 1934 Acts and the Securities and Exchange
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If the current prophecy of virtual demoralization of the market during a marked
downtrend turns out to be true, the effect on institutions will be pronounced. Bonds
other than high grades will follow the same general pattern. A restricted or frozen
position together with painful and perhaps deadly shrinkage in assets may result
and could have disastrous consequences. While efforts to prevent manipulation are
laudable, shackling the law of demand and supply usually proves ineffective and
harmful. Framers of the 1934 Act and those who administer it may well keep in
mind that artificial impediments seeking to check the normal functioning of a
natural law might have a twin boomerang effect upon the public through the
difficulties caused institutions.
State, County and Municipal Securities
As a class, no type of security is more involved, more subject to political factors,
and less susceptible to continued analysis and the application of judgment, than
obligations of political subdivisions. Sins of omission and commission have occurred
in this field as flagrantly as in any other. There have been many cases of deliberate
misrepresentations and misstatements and others of veiled and concealed facts. In
the spring of this year, for example, there was offered to the public an issue of a
Southern municipality, carrying the name of that city (which made it tax exempt),
but which, in reality, was not an obligation of the city at all. It was supported, prin-
cipal and interest, by the income received from the lease of a certain property to a
railroad-nothing else. Stripped of technicalities and red tape, its strength depended
upon the credit of a common carrier and not of a taxing authority. What could
this be called but a thinly disguised misrepresentation?
Frequent changes in administration, the lack of incentive as in business, the
prev.-!ent tendency to blame predecessors in office for misdeeds without assuming
responsibility for their correction, omission of periodic condition reports, etc., all
contribute to the need for regulation. Much could be said in its favor from the view
point of helping to prevent municipalities from again overburdening themselves
with debt and getting into a hopeless financial morass.
Why not have federal regulation of such securities? It is true that state legis-
latures have passed many acts in recent years in an attempt to solve the municipal
finance problem, but these are primarily in the interest of the municipality rather
than the investor. Constitutional and state rights are involved, but in these days
they are no insurmountable barriers. Institutions, as large holders of state, county
and municipal securities, would welcome regulation of municipal bond issues-at
least to the extent of filing registration statements that contain needed data.
Broker-Dealer Segregation
The study, authorized under the Securities Exchange Act, of broker-dealer segre-
gation which has been undertaken by the Commission and which is incomplete as
Commission. The Commission has been in office during one-half of a long term cycle only-not until
we have gone through the remaining half of the cycle under the new securities legislation will we know
its faults and its virtues.
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yet, deserves some mention. If any legislation results, circumscribing the activities
of brokers and dealers in their present dual capacity, the effect will be felt acutely
by institutions.
The Commission's first report on this subject, dated June 30, 1936, is an admirably
calm and sane approach to the problem, although in the writer's opinion somewhat
tinged with a pre-conceived idea of the desirability of segregation. Are not dual
relationships extant in most businesses? Can every such relationship be delineated,
carefully plucked apart and regulated by law? This is dangerous ground.
The report says "Undoubtedly, abuses incident to these multiple relationships
are held in check by the standards of business conduct prevailing among reputable
commission brokers. Practices on the part of a commission house which are detri-
mental to the interests of its brokerage customers would appear, in the final analysis,
to be opposed to the dictates of enlightened self-interest. Nevertheless, such abuses
have not been uncommon in the past." Is any business relationship perfect?
Any disruption of this dual function would make institutional buying and selling
a much less efficient and more difficult operation; it would largely eliminate a source
of valuable investment information now available by virtue of that multiple capacity;
it would bring into play a prejudiced attitude on the part of security houses toward
their institutional customers. All this would have exaggerated effects upon insti-
tutions outside the New York metropolitan area. Much could be added as to the
probable derangement of our entire system of sale and distribution of securities-
it has been made hard enough for institutions as it is.
In the securities business, temptations and opportunities for dishonesty abound
in a measure greater than in almost any other field. It is generally admitted by
those familiar with security operations and by the Commission itself, that standards
of conduct in the business are high. Is it necessary to overthrow the entire system
upon discovery of abuses, or is it wiser to set up means of preventing their recurrence
without destroying a business that has proved its worth?
II
To institutions, nothing can take the place of experience and judgment in the
selection of investment media. No legislation can replace those safeguards. Aside
from the very small banks, insurance companies, etc., (which, for purposes of this
article, must be classed as individual investors) most institutions know what they
want to buy-they are seldom "sold" anything. If they are, that very act is conducive
to the research and analysis which they are prepared to make.
From an institutional viewpoint, the purpose of the Securities Act is primarily
to protect the small investor-institutions did not need such protection. From the
setting up of those safeguards for the small -buyer without making any distinctions,
the large investors gain relatively little. An institution which purchases $i,oooooo
of a new bond issue is put on the same level as the individual who buys $i,ooo of
the same issue-and incidentally both pay the same price. 7  For the protectibn
IQuantity discounts and concessions to institutions were discontinued by underwriters themselves shortly
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which may now be afforded the little fellow, the institution pays a penalty and is
placed in no better position if anything goes wrong.
As an illustration, penalties imposed in the Acts for infractions of the law are
virtually meaningless to financial institutions. As a practical matter, they cannot
sue-they must assume responsibility and suffer for their own mistakes. And as
essentially long term investors, the one to three year limitation on actions to recover
damages, good though this may be, restricts further the value of these remedies.
Why apply these penalties to transactions with institutions when they cannot take
advantage of them? There have been but a negligible number of instances prior
to the enactment of the securities Jegislation where these penalties would have pre-
vented trouble for institutions. It would be far better to discriminate and allow a
restoration of the old institution-underwriter relationship. Whatever evils may
have existed then, the present furtive and clandestine atmosphere that shrouds many
transactions encourages as many, if not more, devious practices. Too much regula-
tion often defeats its own ends-with all of its benefits, the securities legislation has
certainly made investment operations more difficult for institutions.
Desire for improved standards of practice is universal. Like a new broom, a new
agency feels that it must sweep clean, but there is no single rule that can cover a
heterogeneity of circumstances.
III
Specifically, institutions would welcome changes in the law and in the adminis-
tration of it as follows:
First. Amend Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, exempting therefrom insti-
tutions and professional buyers, and allowing free and open discussion with, and
offerings of new securities, to institutions and professional buyers prior to effective
date.
Second. Relax restrictions imposed under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
which have resulted in a large-scale elimination of the legitimate speculator and a
consequent thinning of the market.
Third. Amend the 1933 Act to include issues of states, counties and municipalities.
Fourth. Demand public disclosure by underwriting syndicates of terms of new
offerings two or three days prior to effective date.
Fifth. Remedy conditions under which institutions are now forced to purchase
surreptitiously foreign internal securities not registered with the Commission. In
many cases such issues are necessary holdings in conjunction with business done in
those countries. Now they must be bought under cover and sneaked into this
country.
Sixth. Reduce substantially the cost of securing from the Commission copies of
registration statements, corporation reports, publications, etc.
prior to and during N. R. A. days. Neither the 1933 Act nor any regulations issued by the Commission
contain any prohibition against this practice. Institutions feel that, in simple justice and on a pure busines
basis, they are entitled to discounts on large purchases.
